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Abstract—In this work, we prove that a positive secure degree
of freedom is achievable for a large class of Gaussian channels
as long as the channel is not degraded and the channel is fully
connected. This class includes the MAC wire-tap channel, the 2-
user interference channel with confidential messages, the 2-user
interference channel with an external eavesdropper. Best known
achievable schemes to date for these channels use Gaussian
signaling. In this work, we show that structured codes outperform
Gaussian random codes at high SNR when channel gains are real
numbers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic security, originally proposed by Shan-
non [1], seeks the fundamental limits of reliable transmis-
sion rates when the messages must be kept secret from a
computation-power unlimited adversary whose observation of
the transmitted signals contain some uncertainty. By now, it is
well known that introducing interference into the channel in a
proper manner may increase the uncertainty observed by the
adversary and hence allow for a higher rate of secret messages
[2]–[4]. The interference should be introduced in a way such
that it is more harmful to the adversary than it is to the intended
receiver of the messages. Hence, the key is to achieve a fine
balance between secrecy against the adversary and the level
of harmful interference to the system.
For these channel models, the achieved rate obtained so
far is far from the outer bounds. For example, the genie
outer bound from [4] increases with power P at the speed of
0.5 log2(P ) [5, (69)]. The achievable secrecy rate converges
to a constant when P goes to ∞ [4, Theorem 2]. This means
the gap between the achievable rate and the outer bound is
unbounded and the trade-off between secrecy and interference
is still not well-understood. In fact, once the channel model is
such that the intended receiver is not harmed by the introduced
interference, the achieved secrecy rate immediately comes
within 0.5 bits/channel use of the capacity region, as was
shown for the one sided interference channel in [6] and the
orthogonal MAC wire-tap channel in [7].
In this work, we consider the more general case where
introducing interference will both confuse the eavesdropper
and harm the intended receiver simultaneously. We show,
for a large class of Gaussian channels with confidential
messages where introducing interference effect both the in-
tended receiver and the eavesdropper, that signaling using
structured codes can out-perform signaling with i.i.d. Gaussian
codebooks in high SNR. This class includes the Gaussian
MAC-wiretap channel [2], the Gaussian interference channel
with confidential messages [3] and the Gaussian interference
channel with an external eavesdropper [7]. It has been a
folk conjecture that the achievable rate regions with Gaussian
codebooks in these works were likely optimal and efforts [4],
[5], [7] have been made to find outer bounds to prove this. A
direct consequence of the result we report in this paper is that
this is not so.
This insight comes from studying the secure degree of
freedom of the interference assisted wire-tap channel [4],
which falls under the three channels mentioned above when
only one source node has confidential message to send. As
mentioned before, reference [4] shows that the achieved rate
using Gaussian codebooks converges to a constant as power
increase, which implies the obtained secure degree of freedom
for this channel is 0. In contrast, we find that a positive degree
of freedom is actually achievable for all channel gains as long
as the channel is not degraded. The key to getting this result
is the use of different types of structured codes for appropriate
channel gains rather than Gaussian signaling.
We note that a positive secure degree of freedom is known
to be achievable for the fading channel [8], which requires
coding over different fading states and hence does not imply
the result here.
The result here provides another example that structured
codes are useful in proving information theoretic results. A list
of examples that structured codes outperform simple random
coding arguments in non-secrecy problems can be found in [9].
Using structured code in secrecy problems was first proposed
by the authors in [10]. Up to date structured codes are found
to be useful for relay channels due to the possibility of
compute-and-forward [9], [10], or for interference channels
with more than two users due to the possibility of interference
alignment [11]–[13]. The result here provides the first example
that structured codes are indeed useful for two user Gaussian
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channels as well.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the Gaussian interference-assisted wire-tap chan-
nel [4] shown in Figure 1. In this model, node S1 sends a secret
message W1 via X˜1 to node D1, which must be kept secret
from node D2. We assume the channel is fully connected,
which means that no link’s channel gain equals zero. This
assumption is obviously valid for a wireless medium. Then
after normalizing the channel gains of the two intended links
to 1, the received signals at the two receiving node D1 and
D2 can be expressed as
Y˜1 = X˜1 +
√
aX2 + Z1
Y2 =
√
bX˜1 ±X2 + Z2
(1)
where Zi, i = 1, 2 is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
with unit variance. For now, we assume
√
a and
√
b are real
numbers. The case with complex numbers will be briefly
explained in Section II-B.
Since W1 must be kept secret from D2, we require
lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1|Y n2 ) (2)
The achieved secrecy rate Re is defined as limn→∞ 1nH (W1)
such that the condition (2) is fulfilled and W1 can be reliably
received by D1.
Let X1 =
√
bX˜1 and Y1 =
√
bY˜1. Then from (1), we have
Y1 = X1 +
√
abX2 +
√
bZ1
Y2 = X1 ±X2 + Z2
(3)
In the sequel, we will focus on this scaled model instead, as
we find it more convenient to use it to explain our results.
Let the average power constraint of node Si on Xi be P¯i.
The secure degree of freedom of the secrecy rate is defined as
lim sup
P¯i→∞,i=1,2
Re
1
2
log2
(
2∑
i=1
P¯i
) (4)
It is clear that the secure degree does not change, whether the
model is described via (1) or (3).
A. Relationship with Other Channels
The significance of the interference-assisted wiretap channel
is that it can be considered as a special case of a large class of
channel models with confidential messages, as shown below:
1) If node S2 has a confidential message W2 for D1, which
must be kept secret from D2, then the channel is the
MAC-wiretap channel considered in [2].
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2) If node S2 has a confidential message W2 for D2,
and the message must be kept secret from D1, then
the channel is the interference channel with confidential
message considered in [3].
3) As shown in Figure 2, we can add another receiving
node D0 to Figure 1, to which node S2 wants to sent a
confidential message W2. Again W2 must be kept secret
from D2. Then the channel becomes the interference
channel with an external eavesdropper considered in [7,
Section VI].
Hence, any secrecy rate achieved in the the interference-
assisted wire-tap channel is an achievable individual rate for
all the three multi-user channels mentioned above.
Remark 1: The results here also strengthen a result the
authors derived previously for the K-user interference channel
with confidential messages, where K ≥ 3 [11]. In [11], it is
not known if, for sum secrecy rate, a positive secure degree of
freedom is achievable for arbitrary channel gains. Since the
interference-assisted wire-tap channel is also a special case of
the K-user channel, we see the answer to this question is yes
unless the channel is degraded for any pair of the K users.
B. Complex Channel Gains
More general than the channel with real channel gains is
the channel with complex channel gains. The reason that we
focus on the real case in the sequel is that the complex case
is actually easier in terms of achieving positive secure degree
of freedom, as explained below.
Since the channel is fully connected, after normalization of
the channel gains and variable substitution, the received signals
at nodes D1 and D2 can be expressed as [14]:
Y1 = X1 +
√
abejψX2 +
√
bZ1
Y2 = X1 +X2 + Z2
(5)
where Zi, i = 1, 2 are rotational invariant complex Gaussian
random variables with unit variance. Then we have:
Theorem 1: A secure degree of freedom of 1 is achievable
if ψ 6= 0 or pi mod 2pi.
Proof Outline: Let ImXi = 0, i = 1, 2. Let cotx =
cosx/ sinx. Then since ImY2 = ImZ2, ImY2 does not provide
any information about W1 to the eavesdropper. Hence we
can assume the eavesdropper receives ReY2 only. Node D1
computes g(Y1) = ReY1 − cotψImY1. Then the channel can
be expressed as
g(Y1) = ReX1 +
√
b (ReZ1 − cotψImZ1)
ReY2 = ReX1 +ReX2 +ReZ2
(6)
The channel then becomes an one-sided interference channel.
By transmitting a i.i.d Gaussian noise via ReX2, the channel
is equivalent to a Gaussian wire-tap channel. It is known that
the following secrecy rate is achievable [15]:
C
(
P1
(b csc2 ψ)/2
)
− C
(
P1
P2 + 1/2
)
(7)
where C(x) = 1
2
log2(1 + x). Pi is the average power
constraint on Xi. Hence a secure degree of freedom of 1 is
achievable for this channel.
C. Gaussian Signaling
In [4], an achievable rate is derived with Gaussian code-
books and power control. One implication of this achievable
rate is the high SNR behavior as described by Theorem 2
therein. We re-state this result below:
Theorem 2: With Gaussian codebooks, the achievable se-
crecy rate R1 converges to a constant when the power con-
straint of node D1 and D2 goes to ∞.
This means the achieved secure degree of freedom by the
coding scheme in [4] is 0.
III. THE ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
A. Results on Structured Codes
1) Nested Lattice: A nested lattice code is defined as an
intersection of N -dimensional fine lattice Λ and the fundamen-
tal region of an N -dimensional “coarse” lattice Λc, denoted
by V(Λc). We require that Λc ⊂ Λ. Let uNi be uniformly
distributed over Λ ∩ V(Λc). Let the dithering noise dNi be
a continuous random vector which is uniformly distributed
over V(Λc). Define modulus operation such that x mod Λc =
x − argminu∈Λc ‖x− u‖. Then the values of Xi over N
channel uses are computed as
XNi = (u
N
i + d
N
i ) mod Λc (8)
uNi , d
N
i , i = 1, 2 are independent. We also assume dNi , i = 1, 2
are known by all receiving nodes. Hence they are not used to
enhance secrecy.
As will be shown later, we are interested in lower-bounding
the expression I(uN1 ;XN1 ±XN2 , dN1 , dN2 ), which corresponds
to the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper. To do
that, we need the following result. Its proof follows from the
representation theorem introduced in [10] and is given in [14].
Theorem 3: There exists an random integer T , such that
1 ≤ T ≤ 2N , and XN1 ± XN2 is uniquely determined by
{T,XN1 ±XN2 mod Λc}.
Using Theorem 3, we have
I(uN1 ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , dN1 , dN2 )
=I(uN1 ;X
N
1 ±XN2 mod Λc, T, dN1 , dN2 ) (9)
≤I(uN1 ;XN1 ±XN2 mod Λc, dN1 , dN2 ) +H(T ) (10)
=I(uN1 ;u
N
1 ± uN2 mod Λc) +H(T ) (11)
=H(T ) ≤ N (12)
This means at most N bit per channel use is leaked to the
eavesdropper over N channel uses.
2) Integer Lattice: An integer lattice code with parameter
Q is composed of points in the set [0, Q)∩ Z where Z is the
set of all integers. As will be shown later, in this case, the rate
of information leaked to the eavesdropper is given by f(Q)
defined as:
f(Q) = I(X1;X1 ±X2) (13)
where Xi, i = 1, 2 is uniformly distributed over [0, Q) ∩ Z.
f(Q) can be lower bounded by the following lemma:
Lemma 1: For a positive integer Q,
f(Q) ≤ 1
2
log2(2pie(
1
6
− 1
12Q2
)) <
1
2
log2(
pie
3
) < 0.8 (14)
The proof follows from [13, Lemma 12] and is given in [14].
We next use these results to derive achievable secure degree
of freedom for the interference assisted wire-tap channel.
B. When
√
ab is algebraic irrational
Theorem 4: A secure degree of freedom of 1/2 is achiev-
able when
√
ab is an algebraic irrational number.
Proof: We use the lattice codebook used in [13, Theorem
1]. Let ΛP,ε be the scalar lattice defined as:
ΛP,ε =
{
x : x = P 1/4+εz, z ∈ Z
}
(15)
The codebook CP,ε is given by:
CP,ε = ΛP,ε ∩
[
−
√
P ,
√
P
]
(16)
where P = min{P¯1, P¯2}. It then can be verified that, for large
enough P , we have
log2 |CP,ε| ≥ log2
(
2P 1/4−ε − 1
)
≥ log2
(
P 1/4−ε
)
(17)
The codebook is used for both node S1 and node S2. The
codeword transmitted by node S1 is chosen based on the secret
message W1. The codeword transmitted by node S2 is chosen
independently according to a uniform distribution.
Since the input from S2 is i.i.d., the channel is then
equivalent to a memoryless wire-tap channel [16]. According
to [16], any secrecy rate R such that
R < I (X1;Y1)− I (X1;Y2) (18)
is achievable. Hence we need to find a lower bound to the
right hand side of (18).
According to [13, Theorem 1], p(X1) is chosen to be a
uniform distribution over CP,ε. Under this input distribution,
following a similar derivation to [13, Theorem 1], it can be
shown that when P > 1α2β2 , we have
I (X1;Y1) ≥
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P
2ε
8b
))
log2 (|CP,ε|)− 1 (19)
For I (X1;Y2), we have
I (X1;Y2) ≤ I (X1;Y2, Z2) = I (X1;X1 ±X2) ≤ 0.8 (20)
where (20) follows from Lemma 1. Using (19) (20), and (17),
we find (18) is lower bounded by(
1− 2 exp
(
−P
2ε
8b
))(
1
4
− ε
)
log2 (P )− 1.8 (21)
for sufficiently large P . From (17), ε can take any value
between (0, 1/4). Hence we have completed the proof.
Remark 2: When
√
ab = 1 and all channel gains are
positive, the channel is degraded and from the outer bound
in [4], the secure degree of freedom is 0. Since algebraic
irrational numbers are dense on the real line, it follows that
the secure degree of freedom is discontinuous at
√
ab = 1.
The result in Section III-B only applies when
√
ab is
algebraic irrational, which is a set of measure 0 on the real
line. In the sequel we consider the case where
√
ab is either
rational or transcendental.
C. When
√
ab ≥ 2 or 1/
√
ab ≥ 1/2
Here we use the Q-bit expansion scheme similar to the one
in [17]. Let Q =
√
ab if
√
ab ≥ 2. Otherwise, let Q = 1/
√
ab.
Let ⌊Q⌋ denote the largest integer ≤ Q.
Theorem 5: The following secure degree of freedom is
achievable:
1
2
log2 ⌊Q⌋
log2Q
− f(⌊Q⌋)
2 log2Q
(22)
where f(Q) is defined in (13). (22) is lower bounded by
1
2
log2 ⌊Q⌋
log2Q
−
log2
(
2pie
(
1
6
)− 1
12⌊Q⌋2
)
4 log2 (Q)
(23)
For Q = 2, (22) equals 0.25.
Proof: We begin by considering the case when √ab ≥ 2.
Xk =
√
P0
M−1∑
i=0
ak,iQ
2i, k = 1, 2 (24)
where P0 is a constant scaling factor. ak,i is uniformly dis-
tributed over [0, ⌊Q⌋−1]∩Z, hence ak,i is uniquely determined
by Xk.
The signal received by node D1 is given by
Y1 =
√
P0(
M−1∑
i=0
a1,iQ
2i +
M−1∑
i=0
a2,iQ
2i+1) +
√
bZ1 (25)
We then derive a lower bound to I(X1;Y1)− I(X2;Y2) as
we did for Theorem 4.
Following a similar derivation to [13, Theorem 1], with
Fano’s inequality, it can be shown that I(X1;Y1) is lower
bounded as:
I (X1;Y1) ≥
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
))
H (X1)− 1 (26)
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For I(X1;Y2), we have:
I(X1;Y2) ≤ I(X1;X1 ±X2) (27)
≤
M−1∑
i=0
I(a1,i; a1,i ± a2,i) =Mf(⌊Q⌋) (28)
Therefore, the following secrecy rate is achievable
Re =M(1− 2 exp(−P0
8b
))(log2 ⌊Q⌋)− 1−Mf(⌊Q⌋)
(29)
It can be verified that the transmission power is given by:1
V ar [Xi] = P0
(
⌊Q⌋2 − 1
12
)
Q4M − 1
Q4 − 1 i = 1, 2 (30)
The secure degree of freedom is hence given by by:
lim
M→∞
((
1− 2 exp (−P0
8b
))
log2 ⌊Q⌋ − f(⌊Q⌋)
)
M
1
2
log2 (Q
4M )
(31)
=
1
2
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
))
log2 ⌊Q⌋
log2Q
− f(⌊Q⌋)
2 log2 (Q)
(32)
which can be made arbitrarily close to (22) by choosing a
large enough P0. (23) then follows from (22) via Lemma 1.
When Q = 2, it can be verified that f(⌊Q⌋) = 0.5, and
(32) can be made to be arbitrarily close to 1/4.
The case of 1/
√
ab ≥ 2 can be proved in a similar fashion.
Details can be found in [14].
In Figure 3, we plot the secure degree of freedom achieved
by Theorem 5. We notice as
√
ab moves away from 1, the
lower bound given by (23) becomes tighter, and the secure
degree of freedom converges to 0.5.
Remark 3: A coding scheme similar to the one described
in this section can be constructed with a nested lattice code.
However, the provable secure degree of freedom turns out to
be smaller [14].
1In case it is desired for Xk to have zero mean, we can simply shift Xk
by a constant, which will not change the secrecy rate.
D. When
√
ab = 1
When Y2 = X1 + X2 + Z2, the channel is degraded. The
secure degree of freedom is known to be 0 [4]. When Y2 =
X1 −X2 + Z2, we have the following result:
Theorem 6: The secure degree of freedom of 0.1095 is
achievable.
Proof outline: Here we let Xk =
√
P0
M−1∑
i=0
ak,iQ
i
. Q =
2. The difference is that ak,i is not uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}. Instead we choose to pick its distribution to maximize
I(a1,i; a1,i + a2,i)− I(a1,i; a1,i − a2,i) (33)
which is about 0.1095 when Pr(a1,i = 1) = 0.1443,
Pr(a2,i = 1) = 0.8557. The theorem follows by deriving a
lower bound to I(X1;Y1)−I(X2;Y2). The details are provided
in [14].
E. When 1 <
√
ab < 2 or 1/2 <
√
ab < 1
Let
√
ab = p/q + γ/q, where p, q are coprime positive
integers, and −1 < γ < 1, γ 6= 0. In this case, the channel
can be expressed as:
qY1 = qX1 + (p+ γ)X2 + q
√
bZ1 (34)
Y2 = X1 ±X2 + Z2 (35)
Theorem 7: The following secure degree of freedom is
achievable when |γ| < 1/√2:
log2
(
1− γ2)− log2 (γ2)− 1
log2 (f(γ))− 2 log2 (γ2)
(36)
where
f(γ) = (1− γ2)(q2 + (p+ γ)2) + γ4 (37)
Proof: Here we use a layered coding scheme similar
to [11]. Let the signal send by user k, XNk , be the sum of
codewords from M layers: XNk =
M∑
i=1
XNk,i, k = 1, 2. For the
ith layer, we use the nested lattice code described in Section
III-A1. Let Λi be the fine lattice and Λc,i be the coarse lattice
used in layer i. Hence the signal XNk,i is computed as
XNk,i =
(
uNk,i + d
N
k,i
)
mod Λc,i (38)
where dNk,i is the dithering noise and uNk,i is the lattice point:
uNk,i ∈ V (Λc,i) ∩ Λi, k = 1, 2 (39)
Define Ri as the rate of the codebook for the ith layer. Define
Pi as the average power per dimension of the ith layer. At
layer i, node D1 first decodes quN1,i + puN2,i mod Λc,i, then
decodes uN2,i. The decoder first computes
Yˆi =[
(
quN1,i + pu
N
2,i
)
+ γXN2,i+
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 ] mod Λc,i (40)
Define Ai as Ai =
i−1∑
t=1
(
q2 + (p+ γ)
2
)
Pt+ q
2b. In order for
node D1 to correctly decode quN1,i + puN2,i mod Λc,i from Yˆi,
we require [14]:
Ri ≤ 1
2
log2
(
Pi
γ2Pi +Ai
)
(41)
Node D1 is then left with the following:
[γXN2,i +
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 ] mod Λc,i
(42)
As long as
Pi > γ
2Pi +Ai (43)
(42) can be approximated with high probability [14] by the
following:
γXN2,i +
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 (44)
Otherwise a decoding error is said to occur. Node D1 then
computes:
[γuN2,i +
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 ] mod γΛc,i
(45)
In order for node D1 to decode uN2,i from this signal correctly,
we require [14]:
Ri ≤ 1
2
log2
(
γ2Pi
Ai
)
(46)
Then node D1 can recover the following signal from (44):
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 (47)
which will be fed to the decoder at lower layers.
Let the right hand side of (41) equal to the right hand side
of (46):
Pi
γ2Pi +Ai
=
γ2Pi
Ai
(48)
Then, we have:
Pi = α (αβ + 1)
i−1
q2b (49)
where α = 1−γ
2
γ4 ,β = q
2 + (p+ γ)2. Under this power
allocation, Ai is given by
Ai = (αβ + 1)
i−1 q2b (50)
Ri follows from substituting (49) and (50) into (46):
Ri =
1
2
log2
(
1− γ2
γ2
)
(51)
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(43) requires the term inside the log in (51) to be greater than
1. This means |γ| < 1√
2
. The total power of Di is given by
M∑
t=1
Pt =
(αβ + 1)
M − 1
β
q2b (52)
From (12), each layer leaks at most N bit to the eavesdropper
over N channel uses. Hence the secrecy rate Re,i contributed
by layer i is related to Ri as Re,i ≥ Ri − 1. Hence a secrecy
rate of Re =
∑M
i=1 Ri −M is achievable. The secure degree
of freedom is therefore given by
lim
P→∞
Re
1
2
log2 P
= lim
M→∞
M∑
i=1
Ri −M
1
2
log2 P
=
1
2
log2
(
1−γ2
γ2
)
− 1
1
2
log2 (αβ + 1)
(53)
which equals (36) in Theorem 7.
Remark 4: In Figure 4, we plot the achieved secure degree
of freedom by the nested lattice coding scheme in this section.
q ≤ 20 and p is chosen to be positive integers smaller than
and coprime with q. The figure shows that the secure degree
of freedom is positive when 0.5 <
√
ab < 1 or 1 <
√
ab < 2.
This, along with the results in the previous sections, proves
that the secure degree of freedom is positive everywhere except
when the channel is degraded.
Remark 5: The scheme described in this section also ap-
plies to the case where
√
ab > 2 or
√
ab < 1/2. Plotted
with dashed lines in Figure 4 is the performance of the
integer lattice from previous section. Comparing it with the
performance of the scheme in this section, we find that neither
scheme dominates the other in performance.
Remark 6: It is possible to construct a coding scheme
similar to the one described in this section using an integer
lattice, which may yield a higher secure degree of freedom.
However, it is difficult to find a uniform description of such
code for all p and q. Hence, instead we use a nested lattice code
to prove that a positive secure degree of freedom is achievable.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proved that a positive secure degree
of freedom is achievable for the fully connected interference
assisted wire-tap channel when the channel is not degraded.
As a consequence of this high SNR result, we are able to claim
that, in contrast to common belief, Gaussian signaling is not
optimal for a large class of two user Gaussian channels.
An added practical value of our result is that it implies that
the cooperation of just one node is sufficient to achieve an
arbitrarily large secrecy rate given enough power. Since large
scale cooperation involving multiple nodes is not essential,
this fact enhances the robustness of the network in an adverse
environment.
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